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联邦党人文集 (The Federalist Papers)

作者: 亚历山大·汉米尔顿,约翰·杰,詹姆士·麦迪逊 [美国] (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Madison) 语言: 双语
三位作者都是美国建国初期起过不同作用的资产阶级历史人物。他们当时自称联邦共和国制度。因此,《联邦党人文集》是全面为新宪法辩护的一部著作。对目前联邦政府的无能有了无可置疑的经验以后,要请你们为美利坚合众国慎重考虑一部新的宪法。这个问题本身就能说明它的重要性;因为它的后果涉及联邦的生存、联邦各组成部分的安全与福利,以及一个在许多方面可以说是世界上最引人注意的帝国的命运。时常有人指出,似乎有下面的重要问题留待我国人民用他们的行为和范例来求得解决:人类社会是否真正能够通过深思熟虑和自由选择来建立一个良好的政府,还是他们永远注定要靠机遇和强力来决定他们的政治组织。如果这句话不无道理,那末我们也许可以理所当然地把我们所面临的紧要关头当做是应该作出这项决定的时刻;由此看来,假使我们选错自己将要扮演的角色,那就应当认为是全人类的不幸。这个想法会在爱国心的动机之外又增加关怀人类的动机,以提高所有思虑周到的善良人士对这事件的关切心情。如果我们的选择取决于对我们真正利益的明智估计,而不受与公共利益无关的事实的迷惑和影响,那就万分幸运了。但这件事情与其说是可以认真预期,还不如说是只能热切希望而已。提供给我们审议的那个计划,要影响太多的私人利益,要改革太多的地方机构,因此在讨论中必然会涉及与计划的是非曲直无关的各种事物,并且激起对寻求真理不利的观点、情感和偏见。在新宪法必然会碰到的最大障碍中,可以很容易地发现下列情况:每一州都有某一类的人,他们的明显利益在于反对一切变化,因为那些变化有可能减少他们在州政府中所任职位的权力、待遇和地位;另外还有一类人,他们出于不正常的野心,或者希望趁国家混乱的机会扩大自己的权力,或者认为,对他们来说在国家分为几个部分邦联政府的情况下,要比联合在一起有更多向上爬的机会。

章节目录:

No. 1: General Introduction No. 2: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence No. 3: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) No. 4: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) No. 5: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) No. 6: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States No. 7: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) No. 8: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States No. 9: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection No. 10: The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) No. 11: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy No. 12: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue No. 13: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government No. 14: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered No. 15: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union No. 16: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) No. 17: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) No. 18: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) No. 19: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) No. 20: The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) No. 21: Other Defects of the Present Confederation No. 22: The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) No. 23: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union No. 24: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered No. 25: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) No. 26: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered No. 27: The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) No. 28: The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) No. 29: Concerning the Militia No. 30: Concerning the General Power of Taxation No. 31: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 32: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 33: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 34: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 35: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 36: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) No. 37: Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government No. 38: The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles No. 40: The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained No. 41: General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution No. 42: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered No. 43: The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) No. 44: Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States No. 45: The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered No. 46: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared No. 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts No. 48: These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other No. 49: Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention No. 50: Periodical Appeals to the People Considered No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments No. 52: The House of Representatives No. 53: The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) No. 54: The Apportionment of Members Among the States No. 55: The Total Number of the House of Representatives No. 56: The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) No. 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation No. 58: Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered No. 59: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members No. 60: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) No. 61: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) No. 62: The Senate For the Independent Journal. No. 63: The Senate Continued No. 64: The Powers of the Senate No. 65: The Powers of the Senate Continued No. 66: Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered No. 67: The Executive Department No. 68: The Mode of Electing the President No. 69: The Real Character of the Executive No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered (There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.) No. 71: The Duration in Office of the Executive No. 72: The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered No. 73: The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power No. 74: The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive No. 75: The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive No. 76: The Appointing Power of the Executive No. 77: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered No. 78: The Judiciary Department No. 79: The Judiciary Continued No. 80: The Powers of the Judiciary No. 81: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority No. 82: The Judiciary Continued No. 83: The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury No. 84: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered No. 85: Concluding Remarks
本书已完结